As artificial intelligence systems grow more sophisticated, the question of whether AI can possess consciousness has shifted from philosophical speculation to a critical scientific debate. A new study published in the journal Neuron, led by Director Hakwan Lau of the Institute for Basic Science's Center for Neuroscience Imaging Research, along with collaborators from the University of Montreal and New York University, argues that current scientific methods are insufficient to reliably determine if such entities are conscious. The paper asserts that many existing experimental approaches fail to distinguish genuine subjective experience from general information processing. The research team emphasizes that the study does not aim to definitively prove or disprove consciousness in animals, AI, fetuses, or brain organoids. Instead, it challenges the validity of the tools currently used to measure consciousness. Director Lau notes that while many theories of consciousness appear supported by experimental data, these findings may merely reflect broad information processing capabilities rather than true subjective awareness. Consequently, it remains difficult to conclude that current theories accurately explain the phenomenon. The authors critique popular neuroscience paradigms, including visual masking, binocular rivalry, and perceptual threshold detection. These methods often alter both conscious experience and the brain's overall cognitive capacity, leading researchers to unintentionally conflate the two. This methodological ambiguity may be driving increasingly bold claims about consciousness in non-human entities. Recent discussions have frequently suggested that animals, AI systems, and laboratory-grown organoids might possess forms of sentience. However, the study warns that the experimental markers used to support these claims likely track information processing instead of conscious experience. Drawing on historical lessons, the researchers point out that similar poorly grounded claims in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to a significant scientific backlash. This skepticism eventually gave rise to behaviorism and decades of stagnation in consciousness research. To avoid repeating these mistakes, the paper highlights the need for rigorous neuropsychological conditions where subjective awareness can be dissociated from perception and behavior, such as blindsight and hemispatial neglect. These cases demonstrate that conscious experience and information processing are separable processes, offering a more robust framework for scientific investigation. The team argues that developing methods capable of isolating subjective experience with precision is essential for evaluating future claims regarding consciousness in various entities. As questions about consciousness increasingly influence ethical and societal debates concerning animal welfare, AI ethics, and bioethics, the scientific foundations supporting these claims must be exceptionally rigorous. Director Lau stresses that if science is to guide these critical discussions, the methodology must be clear and reliable. The authors hope this analysis will encourage the field to adopt stricter standards and greater conceptual clarity, ensuring that future discoveries about consciousness are built on solid empirical ground.